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Whether or not one embraces the claim that Hume should be read as con-
sciously advocating strong moral atheism, Holden provides a detailed argument
that Hume’s account of morality is inconsistent with any view of God as posses-
sing moral attributes. In seeking to integrate Hume’s theories concerning moral
psychology with his well-known critiques of natural theology, this monograph
provides an important exercise in reading Hume holistically. One need not think
that Hume is invariably consistent in his views, or even to agree with the central
tenets of Hume’s philosophy, to see the value in this approach.
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Christopher Ryan does not overdramatize his subject with this provocative
subtitle. Rather, he recounts two moments in the development of European
religious consciousness in the nineteenth century as Arthur Schopenhauer
interprets a historical revolution in matters of religious faith taking shape during
his time and virtually before his eyes. Schopenhauer is not only witness to what
he thinks of as an inevitable progression toward atheism and away from naı¨ve
religious totemism and the personiﬁcation of natural forces and human ideals
in monotheistic traditions, especially Christianity, but he contributes philo-
sophically to the process of assassinating God, and he holds out the prospect of a
deeper religious rebirth of understanding inspired by the great Asian mythologies
of Hinduism (Brahmanism) and Buddhism, coinciding not coincidentally with
the principles of Schopenhauer’s own transcendental idealism.
Ryan writes an excellent, philosophically informed, and scholarly account of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion. Schopenhauer has much to say about
religion, and about the concepts of and philosophical reasoning concerning the
existence and nature of God, and the philosophical meaning of many elements of
traditional religious practices, which he ventures to explain from the standpoint
of his speculative metaphysics of the world as will and representation. Ryan has
a thorough grasp of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and a solid background in
comparative religions. He moves comfortably between these two ﬁelds with a
suﬃcient command of the necessary original languages to weave together an
exposition of major topics surrounding Schopenhauer’s complex critique of
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religion. Ryan details Schopenhauer’s sense of a European cultural reawakening
to true religious meaning in the form of a more philosophically respectable
metaphysical appropriation of ‘Oriental ’ religious ideas, dimly glimpsed and
codiﬁed in fables, symbols, and parable for popular consumption in their original
form, but better explicable, Schopenhauer believes, in terms of his own meta-
physics. Christianity, as Schopenhauer perceives the spirit of the age, is slowly but
tangibly vanishing both ideologically and spiritually from the hearts and minds
of contemporary Europe. It is the death of one religion and the transition to a
Europeanized version of the religions of India that constitute the opposing poles
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion in Ryan’s inquiry.
The great religions have sensed the truth that the world in reality is Will, if
Schopenhauer is right. The faithful have nevertheless conceived of the relation
between appearance and the world as it exists independently of thought only by
means of metaphors contained in fantastical stories that gesture toward diﬃcult
metaphysical and moral truths. The hard work of understanding philosophical
ideas is the province of only a few gifted minds, thinks Schopenhauer, and
for the others who cannot hope to penetrate the mysteries of transcendental
metaphysics there is a watered-down simpliﬁed philosophy that is subliminally
enshrined in major world religions. As Christianity’s star fades in Europe, so
the European rediscovery of the religions of India reveals a more primordial
grasp of the reality of the world beyond the ephemeral transitory appearance
of things as pure willing or Will. The Hindu veil of maya equally conceals the
Kantian thing-in-itself from experience with its fabric of illusion, permitting
contact with and descriptive knowledge only of phenomena, the world as rep-
resentation.
Ryan’s book is divided into six chapters of exactly three parts each. Working
through the substance of some of the chapters, one might wonder why such a
rigid architectonic was chosen, and there are reprises of several topics within
the structure of the text. The main chapters are: Introduction (I. The Death of
God and the Oriental Renaissance, II. Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Religion,
III. Hermeneutics vs Comparison); Chapter 1 : Europe and India; Chapter 2:
Metaphysical Need; Chapter 3: The Death of God; Chapter 4: True and Original
Christianity; Chapter 5: The Original Weltanschauung ; Chapter 6: The Oriental
Renaissance. There are also acknowledgements, a key to textual citations
from works by Schopenhauer and other scholarly apparatus, and the chapters
are followed by a conclusion, bibliography, and combined name and subject
index.
Religion as Schopenhauer conceives it may be a poor substitute for the meta-
physics that human beings crave as part of their innate desire to understand the
nature of existence, but it is nevertheless not merely a weak intellect’s surrogate
for transcendental metaphysics. Schopenhauer understands religious asceticism
as an eﬀort to overcome the suﬀering that inevitably occurs as a result of the
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empirical will desiring things, and so suﬀering for their lack, and then suﬀering
satiety and boredom whenever the individual will acting in real time happens
to attain its desires. Ryan touches on but does not deeply develop this aspect
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion, and one could have wished for a
full chapter devoted to the subject. The same might be said of Schopenhauer’s
concept of compassion, which is crucial to his moral philosophy, and which
features prominently especially in Buddhism, as another point connecting
Schopenhauer with Indian religious values, but to which Ryan devotes no at-
tention at all (indeed, the word ‘compassion’ does not even appear in Ryan’s
index).
What Ryan examines thoroughly instead are the questions in a series of inter-
esting historical problems connected with the development of Schopenhauer’s
ideas about religion. There are important controversies surrounding the intro-
duction of several diﬀerent philosophically competent translations of the classic
Indian religious texts, principally the Upanis
˙
ads and Vedas, published in
Germany beginning in the early nineteenth century, and aﬀording a ﬁrst
modern European window revealing ancient Eastern religious teachings during
Schopenhauer’s philosophically formative years. Schopenhauer, surprisingly,
given his linguistic talents and interest and enthusiasm for these writings,
never learned to read Sanskrit, but relied instead on recently published
Latin translations, a language in which he was highly proﬁcient, in order to learn
what the Indian sages taught, and to read between the lines of their verses in
trying to recover their concept of the world and the place of human life in the
world.
The interesting question that Ryan explores at length is the extent to which
Schopenhauer developed an interest in classical Indian religions before or after
he had staked out the main principles of his transcendental idealist metaphysics.
There are numerous similarities, too many to be coincidental. Schopenhauer
distinguishes between the world as will (der Wille), by which he interprets the
Kantian thing-in-itself (Ding an sich), and as representation or idea (Vorstellung).
He accepts a version of the Kantian distinction between how the world appears to
us in thought, and as it must exist independently of all concepts and categories of
the understanding, independently of human perception and all thinking, and
existing outside of the way in which we cognitive subjects experience it and as it
appears to consciousness. It is a commonplace in Schopenhauer studies that
Schopenhauer’s philosophy combines Plato, Kant, and the classical Indian
religious thought of Hinduism (Brahmanism) and Buddhism. Schopenhauer, in
the Appendix to the 1818 edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, declares:
‘ [N]ext to the impression of the world of perception, I owe what is best in my
own development to the impression made by Kant’s works, the sacred writings
of the Hindus, and Plato’. In his Manuscript Remains 1, Schopenhauer similarly
explains: ‘I do not believe my doctrine could have come before the Upanis
˙
ads,
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Plato and Kant could cast their rays simultaneously into the mind of one man’
(see 160).
The question Ryan investigates is exactly how these pieces of the puzzle came
together chronologically in Schopenhauer’s philosophy as presented in his
monumental treatise, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Did Schopenhauer
fashion his transcendental idealism ﬁrst from elements of Plato and Kant and
then tack on a later discovery of Indian thought to the mix? Or was Indian religion
an essential part of the synthesis he achieved more or less from the beginning?
Could it even be, as Soviet-era historian Bernard Bykhovsky has less plausibly
maintained, that Schopenhauer began with Indian thought, and only later sought
collateral support in Plato and Kant for the ideas he absorbed from the Vedas and
Upanis
˙
ads? It would be hard to imagine Schopenhauer as merely following a
contemporary trend of German intellectual interest in the scholarly publication
of the Indian religious classics, and then ﬁnding a place in a pre-existent system
for whatever ideas he may have found in the Indian holy texts that could some-
how be made to ﬁt. One has the deﬁnite sense in reading Schopenhauer that his
interest in ancient Indian religions is sincere, even passionate, and that it is as
much an integral part of his thinking as the metaphysics he takes from Plato and
the transcendental aesthetic he adopts from Kant.
The question remains what concrete evidence and authoritative documen-
tation there might be for one interpretation of Schopenhauer’s contested relation
to Indian religions as against its rivals. Ryan remarks:
A discussion of whether or not Schopenhauer was inﬂuenced by Indological works is
pertinent to his philosophy of religion since, if indeed he was, then his distinction
between philosophy as a self-suﬃcient, demonstrative science, and religion as a
venerable tradition with external, authoritative supports, would be refuted in his
own case. His assimilation of Hinduism and Buddhism as religio-allegorical and
popular equivalents of his own philosophical metaphysics would therefore be
fraudulent. For this reason, we begin this chapter with the much-debated question
of inﬂuence. (159)
If it can be shown that Schopenhauer was exposed to Indian religious ideas from
an early point in his career, and if those inﬂuences can be traced out in his early
publications, such as the ﬁrst (1813) edition of his dissertation, U¨ber die vierfache
Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, and the ﬁrst (1819) edition of Die
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, then a reasonably good case can be made for
Schopenhauer’s involvement with Indian religious thought from the very outset
of his philosophical career, rather than as an addition merely to enhance an
already virtually fully-formed metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of
science, ethics, and aesthetics.
The topic is an important one for Schopenhauer scholarship, because it goes to
the heart of the problem as to whether Schopenhauer’s avowed atheism amounts
to a rejection of religion or merely a rejection of God. As Ryan remarks in several
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places in the book, Schopenhauer was particularly impressed with the fact
that (pure land, hinayana) Buddhism does not posit the existence of God or a
pantheon of gods. Despite not recognizing a divinity or godlike person, Buddhism
in its ﬁrst of four pillars sounds the theme that Schopenhauer was to repeat in
many diﬀerent contexts as the foundation of his moral pessimism, that all life is
suﬀering. The Vedic scriptures in turn furnished Schopenhauer with one of his
most striking images, that of the distinction between phenomena and thing-in-
itself construed as will divided by the veil ofmaya, of mere appearance, delusion
and deception in the realm of the senses. For Ryan, the historical question is one
of identifying as precisely as possible the exact point in time when Schopenhauer
would have begun to read the Indian classics especially in Latin or later in
German translation. What did he learn from these spiritual sources, and when did
he make their acquaintance?
Ryan argues that Schopenhauer ﬁrst became familiar with Abraham Hyacinth
Anquetil-Duperron’s two-volume (1801–1802) Latin translation of the Upanis
˙
ads
(Oupnek’hat) already in 1813, near the very beginning of his period of philo-
sophical activity. Ryan writes: ‘When, later in the same year [1813], Friedrich
Majer directed [Schopenhauer] to the scriptures of classical India, Schopenhauer
discovered therein the outlines of a system of religious metaphysics he con-
sidered compatible with … the intellectual outlook of the age’ (157). That there is
historical justiﬁcation for Schopenhauer’s early introduction to ancient Indian
religions does not necessarily imply, as Ryan suggests, that Schopenhauer’s atti-
tude toward the distinction between philosophy and religion, in contrast with his
own practice is hypocritical and his philosophical metaphysics ‘fraudulent’. It all
rather depends on the nature of the inﬂuence early Indian religious literature may
have exerted on Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
Schopenhauer’s thesis that philosophy is separate from religion does not
mean that philosophy cannot proﬁt from the insights metaphorically presented
in religious dogma, stories and symbolisms, art and architecture, drama and
other forms of literature. Indeed, since Schopenhauer regards philosophy as
a relatively late cultural development, it would be surprising if he had adopted
a narrow view of how philosophy might stand in debt for certain of its insights
to religious instruction and practice. To acknowledge such a genetic connection
between religion and philosophy, whereby philosophy is inﬂuenced by religious
thought, is by no means to deprive philosophy of its independence as an exercise
in abstract theoretization, in which the grounds for accepting concepts, distinc-
tions, and conclusions are required to be given a rigorous justiﬁcation, primarily
involving the kinds of arguments that are seldom if ever found within religious
writings. By analogy, one doubts that Schopenhauer would be embarrassed by
the fact that art and art criticism in at least crude form must have existed
prior to the development of philosophical aesthetics, or that folk wisdom
concerning the discovery and veriﬁcation of knowledge must have predated
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epistemology as a systematic philosophical theory. Why should philosophy
generally and philosophy of religion in particular be any diﬀerent? To object on
such grounds to Ryan’s eﬀort to identify the reason why it is historically and
philosophically worthwhile to track down the chronology of Schopenhauer’s
involvement with Asian religions obviously takes nothing whatsoever away
from Ryan’s assertion that it is important in understanding Schopenhauer’s
philosophy to have a clear sense of when he was originally introduced to the
Upanis
˙
ads.
Thus, Ryan continues:
During the ﬁrst period of his encounter – from his meeting with Majer up to the
completion of the ﬁrst edition of The World as Will and Representation in late
1818 – Schopenhauer’s main sources included the ﬁrst nine volumes of Asiatick
Researches (the journal for the proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal),
Mme de Polier’s Mythologie des Indous, Julius Klaproth’s journal Das Asiatisches
Magazin (which contained Majer’s German translation of Charles Wilkins’ English
Bhagavad-Gita) and Friedrich Schlegel’s On the Language and Wisdom of the
Indians. (159)
By identifying the exact sources that Schopenhauer consulted and which
might have encouraged him in working out the principles of his metaphysics,
moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion, we can better appreciate
that Schopenhauer was no mere dilettante where the latest European research in
ancient Indian religions was concerned.
However, Ryan’s discoveries by themselves do not answer the question which
of Plato, Kant, and Asian thought, all in the melting pot from the beginning
in Schopenhauer’s thought, might have been more formative than the others.
If such a question is impossible to answer without Schopenhauer’s direct testi-
mony, if even Schopenhauer might not have been able to say with any conﬁdence
how these distinct sources may have contributed to his mature conception of
transcendental idealism, we can at least determine from Ryan’s study that
Schopenhauer did not arrive at Indian religion after hammering out the
main principles of his philosophy, to which he then attached a recent trendy
fascination with Hinduism and Buddhism as an afterthought. Ryan in this vein
tentatively endorses the reasonable interpretation of Moira Nicholls, according
to which, ‘the inﬂuence [of Indian texts on Schopenhauer’s philosophy] is
gradual rather than immediate and develops over time as better and more
sources became available to him’ (165). The natural impression that
Schopenhauer was ﬁrst and foremost inﬂuenced by Kant and Plato (in that order)
for whose ideas Indian religion, working through his writings going back to 1811,
provided a partial overlay, is supported as well by Ryan’s argument that :
‘Schopenhauer’s pre-1813 manuscript notes constitute further evidence that he
interpreted Kant’s idealism as a doctrine of illusion with metaphysical and ethical
implications before reading the Oupnek’hat ’ (164).
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The question of exactly how, to what extent and in what order Schopenhauer’s
three principal inﬂuences came to fruition in his thought may ﬁnally be
unanswerable. The importance of such questions in understanding the historical
background to Schopenhauer’s philosophy is nevertheless undeniable, and Ryan
in this valuable new book has appropriately raised and skilfully engaged the
problem of relating these and other aspects of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of
religion.
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